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Summary
Summary
In this book President Carter shares his intimate knowledge of the history of the Middle East and his personal experiences of the principal actors, and he addresses sensitive political issues many British and American officials shy from. This is a challenging and provocative book.
Author Notes
James Earl Carter Jr. was born on October 1, 1924 in Plains, Georgia. He graduated from the Naval Academy in Annapolis, Maryland in 1946, and spent seven years as an officer in the Navy.
When his term was over, Carter returned to Plains and began his career in politics at the state level in 1962. In 1970, he was elected Governor of Georgia and six years later announced his candidacy for the Presidency. Carter campaigned against Gerald Ford and eventually won with 297 electoral votes, becoming the 39th President of the United States.
As President, Carter established a National Energy Policy, expanded the National Park System and created the Department of Education. He was also instrumental in the Camp David Agreement of 1978, which helped to bring peace between Egypt and Israel. Carter established full diplomatic relations with the People's Republic of China and completed negotiations of the SALT II Nuclear Limitations Treaty with the Soviet Union.
Upon completion of his term as President, he founded the Carter Center in Atlanta, a non-profit organization that works to prevent and resolve conflict and to enhance freedom and democracy around the world. In 2002, Carter received the Nobel Peace Prize. He has written several books including An Hour Before Daylight; Palestine: Peace Not Apartheid, Our Endangered Values, A Full Life: Reflections at Ninety, and Faith: A Journey for All.
(Bowker Author Biography)
Reviews (6)
Publisher's Weekly Review
It's hard to use standard criteria to assess this book. Former President Carter is not a very good reader; his tone is flat, and his pronunciation sometimes difficult. Nor is he a literary stylist; there is neither music nor imagery in his down-to-earth sentences. But Carter feels strongly that what he has to say is absent from public discourse and policy decisions, and he knows that his status and voice provide authority to what might otherwise be rejected out of hand as anti-Israeli propaganda. He explains that Israel has never complied with U.N. Resolution 242 and others; has never lived up to its agreements made over the years in Washington, Oslo and elsewhere; continues to grab land through settlements and placement of a wall well within Palestinian territory; and still imprisons thousands of Palestinian men, women and children. While pointing out many murderous and counterproductive moves of Arafat and various Palestinian groups, he pointedly lays the blame for the current situation at the door of the Israelis and their Washington backers, with special venom for Bush and Rice, who have been mute on the subject for six years-even during the invasion of Lebanon. Many will dispute his facts and counter his views, but Carter maintains that if we really want to understand and promote change in this region, we must know both sides of the story. Simultaneous release with the S&S hardcover (Reviews, Nov. 27). (Jan.) (c) Copyright PWxyz, LLC. All rights reserved
Booklist Review
It is generally believed that history will judge Jimmy Carter a better ex-president than president, with his good works as an ex tipping the scales in that direction. His latest book derives from his personal experiences in both arenas: as chief executive of the nation and as founder of the Carter Foundation, his postpresidency organization dedicated to world peace. In essence, the reader is presented with a history of Arab-Israeli discord and the search for a successful resolution. He cites the lack of permanent peace in the Middle East as a persistent threat to global peace and posits that the stumbling blocks to a lasting cessation of armed conflict are to be found within two contexts: Israel's unwillingness to comply with international law and honor its previous peace commitments, and Arab nations' refusal to openly acknowledge Israel's right to live undisturbed. The former president's ideas are expressed with perfect clarity; his book, of course, represents a personal point of view, but one that is certainly grounded in both knowledge and wisdom. His outlook on the problem not only contributes to the literature of debate surrounding it but also, just as importantly, delivers a worthy game plan for clearing up the dilemma. --Brad Hooper Copyright 2006 Booklist
New York Review of Books Review
THIS is a strange little book about the Arab-Israeli conflict from a major public figure. It is premised on the notion that Americans too often get only one side of the story, one uncritically sympathetic to Israel, so someone with authority and knowledge needs to offer a fuller picture. Fine idea. The problem is that in this book Jimmy Carter does not do so. Instead, he simply offers a narrative that is largely unsympathetic to Israel. Israeli bad faith fills the pages. Hollow statements by Israel's enemies are presented without comment. Broader regional developments go largely unexamined. In other words, whether or not Carter is right that most Americans have a distorted view of the conflict, his contribution is to offer a distortion of his own. Yasir Arafat is portrayed as someone who disavowed terrorism. Hafez al-Assad, who was president of Syria until 2000 when he died and his son took over, is quoted for an entire section, offering harsh impressions of Israel, including the opinion that it "initiated the 1967 war in order to take even more Arab land." Carter does not contradict him. The separation barrier that Israel is building along and inside parts of the West Bank is not to stop suicide bombers and other violent attacks. Its "driving purpose," Carter says, is "the acquisition of land." Such misrepresentations - and there are others - are a shame because most of what Carter focuses on is well worth reading about. The barrier (which he calls a "wall" even though a very small percentage is wall) does indeed take land from the Palestinians. His chapter on the endless humiliation of daily life for the Palestinians under Israeli occupation paints a devastating and largely accurate picture of confiscated farm produce, unfair competition from Israeli goods, withheld foreign donations, leveled houses and legal dead ends. Carter is right that insufficient attention is being paid, but perhaps that is because his picture feels like yesterday's story, especially since Israel's departures from southern Lebanon and Gaza have not stopped anti-Israel violence from those areas. This book has something of a Rip van Winkle feel to it, as if little had changed since Carter diagnosed the problem in the 1970s. All would be well today, he suggests, if his advice then had been followed. Forget Al Qaeda (the name does not appear in this book), the nuclear ambitions of Iran and the rise of the Taliban in Afghanistan. If Israel had "refrained from colonizing the West Bank," he asserts, there would have been "a comprehensive and lasting peace." The debate about the Israeli occupation "will shape the future of Israel; it may also determine the prospects for peace in the Middle East - and perhaps the world." This is an awfully narrow perspective. The Middle East could well be the source of the next major war and the chances of avoiding it would be increased if the Israeli question were settled. Moreover, if Israel had not built settle-, ments throughout Gaza and the West Bank, solving its dispute with the Palestinians would probably have been - and would be - a lot easier. Palestinian children at a closed checkpoint in the West Bank town of Hebron in November 2005. But there are other factors to consider, including that for the most radical leaders of the Muslim world - and their numbers are not dwindling - settling the Israel question does not mean an equitable division of land between Israel and Palestine. It means eliminating Israel. To see the narrowness of Carter's perspective, it is worth returning to 1979, the year of the Egypt-Israel peace treaty that resulted from Carter's Camp David mediation as president, a hugely significant accomplishment. Carter rightly accuses Menachem Begin, then Israel's prime minister, of deception regarding the expansion of West Bank settlements. Begin promised to freeze the settlements. Not only did he not do so; he had no intention of doing so. Carter lost re-election in 1980 to Ronald Reagan and suggests that Reagan's nod-and-wink tolerance of Israeli actions - its bombing of Iraq's nuclear reactor, annexation of the Golan Heights, settlement building and 1982 invasion of Lebanon - were the beginning of the end of the process he had set in motion. Yet the trouble that was brewing even before these events suggests they may not have been the central issue Carter sees them as. Egypt was instantly ostracized from the Arab world because of its agreement with Israel. Moreover, 1979 was the year of the Iranian revolution, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and Saddam Hussein's consolidation of power in Iraq. As much as Israeli policies fueled Arab rage - and they certainly did ;- these other forces contributed heavily to the state of affairs today. This does not mean that the problems on the ground have no impact. Israel's friends will increasingly tell you that the dispute is not about land or occupation at all but about the growing radicalism of the Muslim world and its refusal to countenance a Jewish state in its midst. The confiscation of land, the roadblocks and border closings, the preference given to Israeli products within the occupied areas over locally made ones do not amount to much, they say. And those who focus on them are engaging not only in anti-Israel propaganda but in a kind of anti-Semitism. Which is what some are hinting unfairly of Carter. The Anti-Defamation League has run large advertisements in major newspapers, including this one, attacking the book for Carter's propagation of "myths like Jewish control of the government and media." Across the land, Jewish leaders and their friends are asking each other what exactly Carter's problem is with the Jews. Their biggest complaint against the book - a legitimate one - is the word "apartheid" in the title, with its false echo of the racist policies of the old South Africa. But overstatement hardly adds up to anti-Semitism. There is, however, another subtler issue and it has to do with Carter's religious focus. There is a weird scene toward the start of the book in which Carter, a born-again Christian, goes to see Prime Minister Golda Meir on his first visit to Israel in 1973. She asks his impressions. "I said that I had long taught lessons from the Hebrew Scriptures and that a common historical pattern was that Israel was punished whenever the leaders turned away from devout worship of God. I asked if she was concerned about the secular nature of her Labor government." Meir, a secular chain smoker, could only shrug. Carter seems impressed with his own temerity, as he calls it. But the episode hints at his tone deafness about Israel and Jews. Today, those most opposed to Israel's withdrawal from the West Bank are not the secular Labor Party leaders that Carter worried about. They are the leaders of the religious Zionist parties who consider the West Bank not a Palestinian area where Jews once lived, but their Godgiven birthright that must not be yielded. Carter never tells us how he squares his notions of God's punishment of secular Jews with the policies of such devout politicians. Carters new book is premised on the notion that Americans too often get only one side of the story. Ethan Bronner is the deputy foreign editor of The Times.
Choice Review
Among many activities pursued since his presidency, Jimmy Carter has continued involvement in peace negotiations between Israel and the Palestinians. In this account, Carter reviews US attempts to mediate, from his presidency (1977-81) through Palestinian and Israeli elections in 2006. The author describes his meetings and negotiations with political leaders of Egypt, Syria, Jordan, Palestine, and Israel; he became close friends with several. Carter's account has raised the ire of many Israelis and some strong supporters of Israel in the US, with his charge that "Israel's continued control and colonization of Palestinian land ... have been the primary obstacles to a comprehensive peace settlement." He asserts that the construction of a wall by the Israeli government on Arab land, ostensibly to prevent infiltration of terrorists, along with continued occupation and control of the West Bank and Gaza, is contrary to international law. Carter claims these actions constitute a kind of apartheid. Peace will be attained, he asserts, with a two-state solution, Israel's withdrawal to 1967 borders, dismantlement of Jewish settlements in occupied territory, a shared Jerusalem, and equitable resolution of the Arab refugee problem. Appendixes include several relevant UN resolutions and other peace proposals. ^BSumming Up: Recommended. General readers, lower-division undergraduates through faculty. D. Peretz emeritus, SUNY at Binghamton
School Library Journal Review
Adult/High School-This is not intended to be a scholarly work but rather a frank assessment of the current state of affairs in the Middle East by an experienced elder statesman. Maintaining that "there is a formula for peace with justice in this-portion of the world," ex-President Carter proceeds to argue his point with clarity and urgency. His perspective derives from his term as president, his successful brokering of peace between Egypt and Israel via the 1978 Camp David Accords, and his continued involvement with the Israeli/Palestinian issue in the 30 ensuing years. He includes necessary historical context, traces the role of the U.S. in each succeeding administration since he left office, and mentions vital roles played by Syria, Jordan, Lebanon, and Saudi Arabia. Carter points to the 1979 Israeli-Egyptian peace treaty as proof that "ancient enemies" can coexist and sees hope in the statistical majorities of both Israelis and Palestinians who desire a resolution to conflict, despite the words and actions of some of their political leaders-whom he labels the "obstacles to peace." Whether one is steeped in knowledge of the Middle East or new to the subject, this book is essential reading, for it stimulates precisely the kind of dialogue that Carter believes is necessary to prod all affected peoples beyond present roadblocks to a just and lasting peace.-Dori DeSpain, Fairfax County Public Library, VA (c) Copyright 2010. Library Journals LLC, a wholly owned subsidiary of Media Source, Inc. No redistribution permitted.
Library Journal Review
The man who brokered peace between Israel and Egypt confronts today's Middle East. With a six-city tour. (c) Copyright 2010. Library Journals LLC, a wholly owned subsidiary of Media Source, Inc. No redistribution permitted.
Excerpts
Excerpts
17 SUMMARY Since the Israeli-Egyptian peace treaty was signed in 1979, much blood has been shed unnecessarily and repeated efforts for a negotiated peace between Israel and her neighbors have failed. Despite its criticism from some Arab sources, this treaty stands as proof that diplomacy can bring lasting peace between ancient adversaries. Although disparities among them are often emphasized, the 1974 Israeli-Syrian withdrawal agreement, the 1978 Camp David Accords, the Reagan statement of 1982, the 1993 Oslo Agreement, the treaty between Israel and Jordan in 1994, the Arab peace proposal of 2002, the 2003 Geneva Initiative, and the International Quartet's Roadmap all contain key common elements that can be consolidated if pursued in good faith. There are two interrelated obstacles to permanent peace in the Middle East: Some Israelis believe they have the right to confiscate and colonize Palestinian land and try to justify the sustained subjugation and persecution of increasingly hopeless and aggravated Palestinians; and Some Palestinians react by honoring suicide bombers as martyrs to be rewarded in heaven and consider the killing of Israelis as victories. In turn, Israel responds with retribution and oppression, and militant Palestinians refuse to recognize the legitimacy of Israel and vow to destroy the nation. The cycle of distrust and violence is sustained, and efforts for peace are frustrated. Casualties have been high as the occupying forces impose ever tighter controls. From September 2000 until March 2006, 3,982 Palestinians and 1,084 Israelis were killed in the second intifada, and these numbers include many children: 708 Palestinians and 123 Israelis. As indicated earlier, there was an ever-rising toll of dead and wounded from the latest outbreak of violence in Gaza and Lebanon. The only rational response to this continuing tragedy is to revitalize the peace process through negotiations between Israelis and Palestinians, but the United States has, in effect, abandoned this effort. It may be that one of the periodic escalations in violence will lead to strong influence being exerted from the International Quartet to implement its Roadmap for Peace. These are the key requirements: a. The security of Israel must be guaranteed. The Arabs must acknowledge openly and specifically that Israel is a reality and has a right to exist in peace, behind secure and recognized borders, and with a firm Arab pledge to terminate any further acts of violence against the legally constituted nation of Israel. b. The internal debate within Israel must be resolved in order to define Israel's permanent legal boundary. The unwavering official policy of the United States since Israel became a state has been that its borders must coincide with those prevailing from 1949 until 1967 (unless modified by mutually agreeable land swaps), specified in the unanimously adopted U.N. Resolution 242, which mandates Israel's withdrawal from occupied territories. This obligation was reconfirmed by Israel's leaders in agreements negotiated in 1978 at Camp David and in 1993 at Oslo, for which they received the Nobel Peace Prize, and both of these commitments were officially ratified by the Israeli government. Also, as a member of the International Quartet that includes Russia, the United Nations, and the European Union, America supports the Roadmap for Peace, which espouses exactly the same requirements. Palestinian leaders unequivocally accepted this proposal, but Israel has officially rejected its key provisions with unacceptable caveats and prerequisites. Despite these recent developments, it is encouraging that Israel has made previous commitments to peace as confirmed by the Camp David Accords, the withdrawal of its forces from the Sinai, the more recent movement of settlers from Gaza, and its official endorsement of pertinent U.N. resolutions establishing its legal borders. After the Six-Day War in 1967, Israeli military forces occupied all of the territory indicated on Map 4, but joined the United States and other nations in supporting United Nations Resolution 242, which is still the binding law that condemns the acquisition of land by force and requires Israeli withdrawal from occupied territories. c. The sovereignty of all Middle East nations and sanctity of international borders must be honored. There is little doubt that accommodation with Palestinians can bring full Arab recognition of Israel and its right to live in peace, with an Arab commitment to restrain further violence initiated by extremist Palestinians. The overriding problem is that, for more than a quarter century, the actions of some Israeli leaders have been in direct conflict with the official policies of the United States, the international community, and their own negotiated agreements. Regardless of whether Palestinians had no formalized government, one headed by Yasir Arafat or Mahmoud Abbas, or one with Abbas as president and Hamas controlling the parliament and cabinet, Israel's continued control and colonization of Palestinian land have been the primary obstacles to a comprehensive peace agreement in the Holy Land. In order to perpetuate the occupation, Israeli forces have deprived their unwilling subjects of basic human rights. No objective person could personally observe existing conditions in the West Bank and dispute these statements. Two other interrelated factors have contributed to the perpetuation of violence and regional upheaval: the condoning of illegal Israeli actions from a submissive White House and U.S. Congress during recent years, and the deference with which other international leaders permit this unofficial U.S. policy in the Middle East to prevail. There are constant and vehement political and media debates in Israel concerning its policies in the West Bank, but because of powerful political, economic, and religious forces in the United States, Israeli government decisions are rarely questioned or condemned, voices from Jerusalem dominate in our media, and most American citizens are unaware of circumstances in the occupied territories. At the same time, political leaders and news media in Europe are highly critical of Israeli policies, affecting public attitudes. Americans were surprised and angered by an opinion poll, published by the International Herald Tribune in October 2003, of 7,500 citizens in fifteen European nations, indicating that Israel was considered to be the top threat to world peace, ahead of North Korea, Iran, or Afghanistan. The United States has used its U.N. Security Council veto more than forty times to block resolutions critical of Israel. Some of these vetoes have brought international discredit on the United States, and there is little doubt that the lack of a persistent effort to resolve the Palestinian issue is a major source of anti-American sentiment and terrorist activity throughout the Middle East and the Islamic world. A new factor in the region is that the Palestinian election of January 2006 gave Hamas members control of the parliament and a cabinet headed by the prime minister. Israel and the United States reacted by announcing a policy of isolating and destabilizing the new government. Elected officials are denied travel permits to participate in parliamentary affairs, Gaza is effectively isolated, and every effort is made to block humanitarian funds to Palestinians, to prevent their right to employment or commercial trade, and to deny them access to Israel and the outside world. In order to achieve its goals, Israel has decided to avoid any peace negotiations and to escape even the mild restraints of the United States by taking unilateral action, called "convergence" or "realignment," to carve out for itself the choice portions of the West Bank, leaving Palestinians destitute within a small and fragmented remnant of their own land. The holding of almost 10,000 Arab prisoners and the destructive military response to the capture of three Israeli soldiers have aroused global concern about the hair-trigger possibility of a regional war being launched. Despite these immediate challenges, we must not assume that the future is hopeless. Down through the years I have seen despair and frustration evolve into optimism and progress and, even now, we must not abandon efforts to achieve permanent peace for Israelis and freedom and justice for Palestinians. There are some positive factors on which we may rely. As I said in a 1979 speech to the Israeli Knesset, "The people support a settlement. Political leaders are the obstacles to peace." Over the years, public opinion surveys have consistently shown that a majority of Israelis favor withdrawing from Palestinian territory in exchange for peace ("swapping land for peace"), and recent polls show that 80 percent of Palestinians still want a two-state peace agreement with Israel, with nearly 70 percent supporting the moderate Mahmoud Abbas as their president and spokesman. There have been some other encouraging developments over the years. Along with the awareness among most Israelis that a solution to the Palestinian question is critical if there is ever to be a comprehensive settlement, there is a growing recognition in the Arab world that Israel is an unchanging reality. Most Palestinians and other Arabs maintain that the proposal made by Saudi Arabia's King Abdullah, a proposal approved at the Arab summit in 2002 (Appendix 6), is a public acknowledgment of Israel's right to exist within its legal borders and shows willingness to work out disputes that have so far not been addressed directly. The Delphic wording of this statement was deliberate, in Arabic as well as in Hebrew and English, but the Arabs defend it by saying it is there to be explored by the Israelis and others and that, in any case, it is a more positive and clear commitment to international law than anything now coming from Israel. Furthermore, the remaining differences and their potential resolution are clearly defined. Both Israel and the Arab countries have endorsed the crucial and unavoidable U.N. Resolutions 242 and 338, under which peace agreements have already been evolved. Here are two voices, one Palestinian and the other Israeli, with remarkably similar assessments of what needs to be done. Jonathan Kuttab, Palestinian human rights lawyer: "Everybody knows what it will take to achieve a permanent and lasting peace that addresses the basic interests of both sides: It's a two-state solution. It's withdrawal to 1967 borders. It's dismantlement of the settlements. It's some kind of shared status for a united Jerusalem, the capital of both parties. The West Bank and Gaza would have to be demilitarized to remove any security threats to Israel. Some kind of solution would have to be reached for the refugee problem, some qualified right of return, with compensation. Everyone knows the solution; the question is: Is there political will to implement it?" Dr. Naomi Chazan, professor at Hebrew University and former deputy speaker of the Israeli Knesset: "I don't think any difference now remains between the majority of Israelis and Palestinians in understanding that there has to be some kind of accommodation between both people. There are two possibilities on how to do it. To acknowledge and then to implement the Palestine right to self-determination, and to make sure that the two-state solution is a just and fair solution, allowing for the creation of a viable state alongside Israel on the 1967 boundaries, and if there are any changes, they are by agreement on a swap basis. And on the Israeli side, there is the need to maintain a democratic state with a Jewish majority, which can only be achieved through the creation of a Palestinian state alongside Israel." An important fact to remember is that President Mahmoud Abbas retains all presidential authority that was exercised by Yasir Arafat when he negotiated the Oslo Agreement, and the Hamas prime minister has stated that his government supports peace talks between Israel and Abbas. He added that Hamas would modify its rejection of Israel if there is a negotiated agreement that Palestinians can approve (as specified in the Camp David Accords). It is imperative that the general Arab community and all significant Palestinian groups make it clear that they will end the suicide bombings and other acts of terrorism when international laws and the ultimate goals of the Roadmap for Peace are accepted by Israel. One promising development came in May 2006 when Marwan Barghouti, the most popular and influential leader of Fatah, joined forces in an Israeli prison with Abed al-Halak Natashe, a trusted spokesman for Hamas, in endorsing a two-state proposal that could unite the two Palestinian factions. Their influence is enormous. The prisoners' proposal called for a unity government with Hamas joining the PLO, the release of all political prisoners, acceptance of Israel as a neighbor within its legal borders, and an end to violent acts within Israel (but not in Palestinian territory). It endorsed the key U.N. resolutions regarding legal borders and the right of return. With public opinion polls indicating a 77 percent rate of approval, President Abbas first proposed a referendum among Palestinians on the prisoners' proposal, and then both Hamas and Fatah accepted its provisions. Although a clear majority of Israelis are persistently willing to accept terms that are tolerable to most of their Arab neighbors, it is clear that none of the options is attractive for all Israelis: A forcible annexation of Palestine and its legal absorption into Israel, which could give large numbers of non-Jewish citizens the right to vote and live as equals under the law. This would directly violate international standards and the Camp David Accords, which are the basis for peace with Egypt. At the same time, non-Jewish citizens would make up a powerful swing vote if other Israelis were divided and would ultimately constitute an outright majority in the new Greater Israel. Israel would be further isolated and condemned by the international community, with no remaining chance to end hostilities with any appreciable part of the Arab world. A system of apartheid, with two peoples occupying the same land but completely separated from each other, with Israelis totally dominant and suppressing violence by depriving Palestinians of their basic human rights. This is the policy now being followed, although many citizens of Israel deride the racist connotation of prescribing permanent second-class status for the Palestinians. As one prominent Israeli stated, "I am afraid that we are moving toward a government like that of South Africa, with a dual society of Jewish rulers and Arab subjects with few rights of citizenship. The West Bank is not worth it." An unacceptable modification of this choice, now being proposed, is the taking of substantial portions of the occupied territory, with the remaining Palestinians completely surrounded by walls, fences, and Israeli checkpoints, living as prisoners within the small portion of land left to them. Withdrawal to the 1967 border as specified in U.N. Resolution 242 and as promised in the Camp David Accords and the Oslo Agreement and prescribed in the Roadmap of the International Quartet. This is the most attractive option and the only one that can ultimately be acceptable as a basis for peace. Good-faith negotiations can lead to mutually agreeable exchanges of land, perhaps permitting a significant number of Israeli settlers to remain in their present homes near Jerusalem. One version of this choice was spelled out in the Geneva Initiative. The bottom line is this: Peace will come to Israel and the Middle East only when the Israeli government is willing to comply with international law, with the Roadmap for Peace, with official American policy, with the wishes of a majority of its own citizens -- and honor its own previous commitments -- by accepting its legal borders. All Arab neighbors must pledge to honor Israel's right to live in peace under these conditions. The United States is squandering international prestige and goodwill and intensifying global anti-American terrorism by unofficially condoning or abetting the Israeli confiscation and colonization of Palestinian territories. It will be a tragedy -- for the Israelis, the Palestinians, and the world -- if peace is rejected and a system of oppression, apartheid, and sustained violence is permitted to prevail. Copyright (c) 2006 by Jimmy Carter Excerpted from Palestine Peace Not Apartheid by Jimmy Carter All rights reserved by the original copyright owners. Excerpts are provided for display purposes only and may not be reproduced, reprinted or distributed without the written permission of the publisher.
Table of Contents
| List of Maps Historical Chronology |
| 1 Prospects for Peace |
| 2 My First Visit to Israel, 1973 |
| 3 My Presidency, 1977-81 |
| 4 The Key Players |
| 5 Other Neighbors |
| 6 The Reagan Years, 1981-89 |
| 7 My Visits with Palestinians |
| 8 The George H. W. Bush Years |
| 9 The Oslo Agreement |
| 10 The Palestinian Election, 1996 |
| 11 Bill Clinton's Peace Efforts |
| 12 The George W. Bush Years |
| 13 The Geneva Initiative |
| 14 The Palestinian Election, 2005 |
| 15 The Palestinian and Israeli Elections, 2006 |
| 16 The Wall as a Prison |
| 17 Summary |
| Appendix 1: U.N. Resolution 242, 1967 |
| Appendix 2: U.N. Resolution 338, 1973 |
| Appendix 3: Camp David Accords, 1978 |
| Appendix 4: Framework for Egypt-Israel Peace Treaty, 1978 |
| Appendix 5: U.N. Resolution 465, 1980 |
| Appendix 6: Arab Peace Proposal, 2002 |
| Appendix 7: Israel's Response to the Roadmap, May 25, 2003 |
| Acknowledgments |
| Index |
