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Summary
Summary
In this urgent, balanced, and passionate book, Nobel Peace Laureate and former President Jimmy Carter argues that the present moment is a unique time for achieving peace in the Middle East -- and he offers a bold and comprehensive plan to do just that. President Carter has been a student of the biblical Holy Land all his life. For the last three decades, as president of the United States and as founder of The Carter Center, he has studied the complex and interrelated issues of the region's conflicts and has been actively involved in reconciling them. He knows the leaders of all factions in the region who will need to play key roles, and he sees encouraging signs among them. Carter describes the history of previous peace efforts and why they fell short. He argues persuasively that the road to a peace agreement is now open and that it has broad international and regional support. Most of all, since there will be no progress without courageous and sustained U.S. leadership, he says the time for progress is now. President Barack Obama is committed to a personal effort to exert that leadership, starting early in his administration. This is President Carter's call for action, and he lays out a practical and doable path to peace.
Author Notes
James Earl Carter Jr. was born on October 1, 1924 in Plains, Georgia. He graduated from the Naval Academy in Annapolis, Maryland in 1946, and spent seven years as an officer in the Navy.
When his term was over, Carter returned to Plains and began his career in politics at the state level in 1962. In 1970, he was elected Governor of Georgia and six years later announced his candidacy for the Presidency. Carter campaigned against Gerald Ford and eventually won with 297 electoral votes, becoming the 39th President of the United States.
As President, Carter established a National Energy Policy, expanded the National Park System and created the Department of Education. He was also instrumental in the Camp David Agreement of 1978, which helped to bring peace between Egypt and Israel. Carter established full diplomatic relations with the People's Republic of China and completed negotiations of the SALT II Nuclear Limitations Treaty with the Soviet Union.
Upon completion of his term as President, he founded the Carter Center in Atlanta, a non-profit organization that works to prevent and resolve conflict and to enhance freedom and democracy around the world. In 2002, Carter received the Nobel Peace Prize. He has written several books including An Hour Before Daylight; Palestine: Peace Not Apartheid, Our Endangered Values, A Full Life: Reflections at Ninety, and Faith: A Journey for All.
(Bowker Author Biography)
Reviews (4)
Publisher's Weekly Review
The former president's audio edition of his latest title has an enhanced CD featuring downloadable, helpful maps and relevant historical documents. The maps, in particular, add valuable context and demonstrate the volatile overlapping of cultures and faiths in a relatively small sliver of land. As an added bonus, the package also contains a sample CD from Bringing Peace to a Changing World, the third volume in Carter's acclaimed Sunday Mornings in Plains Bible study series. Perhaps comparing a straightup audio book adaptation with recordings of Carter in a dynamic and spontaneous teaching environment is unfair, but listeners will notice the stark contrast between Carter's competent but stilted delivery in We Can Have Peace and the animated and engaging speaking style of Sunday Mornings in Plains. A Simon & Schuster hardcover (reviewed online). (Jan.) (c) Copyright PWxyz, LLC. All rights reserved
Booklist Review
The former president returns to a favorite topic no, a passion of his that was also the subject of one of his previous books, Palestine Peace Not Apartheid (2006). His more-or-less constant pondering of how to settle peace in the Middle East led him, in the previous book, to offer some criticism of Israeli politics, which landed him in considerable hot water among American readers and politicians. Carter is now encouraged that signs point to the possibility of peace at hand, and in turn he encourages President-elect Obama to take advantage of the current opening through which a resolution of conflict between Israel and its neighbors might be wrested, despite the fact that there has been no tangible progress during the past decade and a half. What Carter views as promising is the winds carrying an overwhelming common desire for peaceful and prosperous lives among the citizens of Israel, Palestine, Lebanon, Syria, Jordan, and Egypt but American leadership is definitely required to be the catalyst for making the formula work and take hold. The steps by which the new American president can bring cohesion of agendas and efforts and thus find peace are spelled out in Carter's trademark even prose. As always, his is a voice to be listened to.--Hooper, Brad Copyright 2008 Booklist
New York Review of Books Review
"YOU don't ever want a crisis to go to waste," the new White House chief of staff, Rahm Emanuel, has said, exuberantly defining the economic meltdown as an opportunity for grand new domestic policies. The war in Gaza raises the question of whether Emanuel's boss will apply the same approach overseas. Will President Obama regard the latest Israeli-Palestinian bleeding as a symptom of an untreatable chronic disease, or as an acute crisis that proves the need for a dramatic American diplomatic initiative? Jimmy Carter's advice on answering that question is clear from his title, even if he dashed this book off before the most recent war. In fact, "We Can Have Peace in the Holy Land" is really a short op-ed article disguised as a book. The argument, which might easily have been put in 900 words, is that Obama should follow Carter's own example, defy political calculations and throw himself into Arab-Israeli peacemaking. The goal, Carter says, should be reaching a two-state solution, with the borders between Israel and the Palestinian state based on the pre-1967 armistice lines, along with minor territorial exchanges. Obama should get to work at the start of his term, put his own peace proposals on the table and persuade both parties to accept them. Carter implies that Obama must separate support for Israel from support for Israel's policies. In short, he should do what Carter says he did to bring peace between Israel and Egypt. Achieving peace, Carter argues, also requires reversing two elements of George W. Bush's policy: his coldness toward negotiations between Israel and Syria, and his effort to isolate Hamas. Again, he presents himself as a model for Obama, since he met with the Syrian president, Bashar al-Assad, and with Hamas leaders during his Middle East tour last year. Carter describes, albeit altogether too briefly, Hamas's terror campaign against Israeli civilians. (In general, he has an easier time talking about Israeli obstacles to peace than Palestinian ones.) But without Hamas's involvement, he argues, there will be no agreement. And with no agreement in sight, even moderate Palestinians are beginning to consider the one-state alternative: demanding full political rights in Israel, which would lose its Jewish majority and become a binational state. Carter's counsel lacks a couple of critical elements. Nonetheless, it has much to recommend it. The Gaza crisis is a reminder, as if another were needed, that ignoring this conflict is equivalent to waiting for it to explode again, with shock waves felt across the entire region. While a peace initiative may look risky, it might actually be the most prudent course the new administration could pursue. Unfortunately, Carter's book reads as if it had first been spoken into a recorder for a couple of weeks, with the author working mainly from memory and his diary. Much of "We Can Have Peace in the Holy Land" is a listing of events, usually meetings held by Carter with important people. It's strange that a former president of the United States feels such a need to name-drop. A BEGINNING student of the Middle East should not learn diplomatic history from this text. In Carter's telling, the Egyptian president Anwar Sadat went to Jerusalem at his prodding. More objective accounts portray Sadat as making an end run around Carter's stubborn intent to reconvene the Geneva peace conference. Yet it was Carter who convinced Sadat that he would have to recognize Israel to get the Sinai back. And at Camp David in 1978, Carter succeeded in reaching the goal that eluded Bill Clinton at Camp David 22 years later - cajoling an Israeli and an Arab leader to make peace. This required deep American involvement, driven by the president. The curious thing about Carter's history is that he can be wrong on the details and right about the conclusions. Anwar Sadat, Jimmy Carter and Menachem Begin at the White House after the signing of the peace treaty between Egypt and Israel on March 26, 1979. The agreement with Egypt arguably improved Israel's security as much as any other single event in its history. Yet a portion of American Jewry has never forgiven Carter for his success. This hints at a key lacuna in Carter's agenda: though he got into the peacemaking business as a politician, he gives too little attention to the need for building political support for a diplomatic initiative - among voters at home as much as among Israelis and Palestinians. Indirectly, Carter's title also hints at a second lacuna. Looking for a neutral name for the area between the Jordan River and the Mediterranean, he chooses "Holy Land," a phrase from Christian tradition. Carter's perspective is explicitly religious. Though that can irritate secular observers, it has served him well. His faith helped him build personal connections both to Sadat and to the Israeli leader Menachem Begin, despite Begin's intransigence. Yet when he finally presents his outline of a peace agreement here, he makes no new, creative proposal for the future of the holy place claimed by Jews as the Temple Mount and by Muslims as Haram al-Sharif. Given Carter's sensitivity to religious issues, this is surprising and disappointing. Then again, an op-ed article can't answer every question, even an article stretched as long as this one. Not accidentally, the publication date for "We Can Have Peace in the Holy Land" was Jan. 20. Its most important intended reader should take seriously Carter's advice to pursue peace, while applying his own considerably greater skills to building a constituency for that effort. Gershom Gorenberg is the author of "The Accidental Empire: Israel and the Birth of the Settlements, 1967-1977," and a senior correspondent for The American Prospect.
Library Journal Review
These two works complement each other nicely. Both authors have had many years of involvement in the issues; both express hope about how peace can be achieved. Sadat (A Woman of Egypt), widow of Egypt's President Anwar Sadat, who won the 1978 Nobel Peace Prize for his courageous recognition of Israel, combines her analysis of peace negotiations with her perspective as a devout Muslim and a successful professional woman. Carter focuses more exclusively on political issues from his background overseeing successful negotiations between Israel and Egypt in 1979 and his subsequent years of engagement in Middle Eastern issues. Both believe that the issues of Israel's security, Palestinian sovereignty, stable borders, settlement of refugees, and the status of Jerusalem can be resolved through solutions already outlined in principle. Both identify Israeli settlements and occupation of the West Bank along with the weakness and fragmentation of Palestinian leadership as key obstacles to peace. Carter emphasizes the history of negotiations since the 1970s, a growing recognition of the possibilities of two secure states in the Holy Land, and the destructive influence of militant minorities in each society. He also stresses the necessity for strong and sustained U.S. involvement to keep negotiations moving. In contrast, Sadat's focus on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is broadened by her exposition of her husband's career, her development as a writer and teacher in the United States after his assassination, and her understanding of Islam as a religion that supports tolerance, diversity, democracy, and an active role for women. Both authors remind us that a majority of Israelis and Palestinians want peace. These two books would be valuable additions to most libraries because of the perspectives they provide for understanding this dangerous conflict.-Dr. Elizabeth R. Hayford, president (retired), Associated Colls.of the Midwest, Evanston, IL (c) Copyright 2010. Library Journals LLC, a wholly owned subsidiary of Media Source, Inc. No redistribution permitted.
Excerpts
Excerpts
Introduction Storm Over a Book I am writing another book about the Middle East because the new president of the United States is facing a major opportunity -- and responsibility -- to lead in ending conflict between Israel and its neighbors. The time is now. Peace is possible. The normal path to resolving conflicts in this regional tinderbox should be through political leaders in Israel, Palestine, Syria, and Lebanon, with assistance when needed from Egypt, other Arab nations, and the international community. Yet for the past fifty years the United States has been widely recognized as the essential interlocutor that can provide guidance, encouragement, and support to those who want to find common ground. Unfortunately, most leaders in Washington have not been effective in helping the parties find peace, while making it harder for other potential mediators in Europe, the Near East, and the United Nations to intercede. This peace effort should not be seen as a hopeless case. Five Nobel Peace Prizes have been won by leaders who negotiated successfully in 1979 and in 1993 -- one Egyptian, three Israelis, and one Palestinian. But the unpleasant fact is that there has been no tangible progress during the past decade and a half, despite significant efforts during the last years of the administrations of Bill Clinton and George W. Bush. Recent highly publicized peace talks between Israeli and Palestinian leaders have broached difficult issues but ultimately failed to narrow differences. At the same time, Israel and Syria became engaged early in 2007 in "indirect" conversations sponsored by Turkey, a fragile Gaza cease-fire has been implemented, and there has been an exchange of prisoners and the remains of others between Israel and Hezbollah but no further plans for easing tension between Israel and Lebanon. As will be explained in the text, one of the notable developments in the region has been the repeated proposal by all twenty-two Arab nations to have normal diplomatic and commercial relations with Israel, provided major U.N. resolutions are honored. They have also said that modifications concerning controversial key issues could be considered in good-faith negotiations. This peace offer has been accepted by all Islamic nations and lauded by top U.S. officials, and Israelis have said it is a good basis for discussion. If pursued aggressively with the full support of the United States and other members of the International Quartet, this Arab proposal could provide a promising avenue toward breaking the existing deadlock in promoting peace. This might make possible the formation of a multinational peace force in the West Bank to guarantee Israel's security, the release of prisoners (including a prominent jailed leader, Marwan Barghouti, who might heal divisions), updating the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) to include members from Hamas and other factions, and reconciliation between the two major Palestinian political parties. If a general framework could be forged, it would be difficult for minor factions to block a peace agreement. Absent any real progress, conditions continue to fester, with Palestinians divided into two major parties. One group, Fatah, is "governing" in some parts of the West Bank not controlled by Israel (see Map 1, which shows actual control), supported officially by the international community as the dominant element of the PLO. Mahmoud Abbas was elected president of the Palestinian Authority to succeed Yasir Arafat, and he heads an interim government with most members from his Fatah Party. The other major group, Hamas, controls the small area of Gaza under the leadership of a group of local militants and more influential leaders of the politburo in Damascus, Syria. There are loyal supporters of these two major parties in both Gaza and the West Bank, and some tentative efforts are detectable among them and from other Arab leaders to reunite the two factions. As will be explained in Chapter 10, unified Palestinians, with a workable government and a competent security force, are a prerequisite to any substantive peace agreement with Israel, but these initiatives have been blocked or undermined by mutual animosity and by opposition from Jerusalem and Washington. It has not been possible for the weak and divided Palestinian leadership to eliminate acts of violence against Israel from within the occupied territories, and many Israelis are fearful for their personal safety and for the ultimate security of their nation. To defend themselves, they accept their government's policy of harsh reprisals and the constant expansion of settlements, although the majority of Israelis do not support the settlements as an alternative to peace. Except for some infrequent public statements and assurances given to me based on the prospect of an Israeli-PLO peace agreement, Hamas has not acknowledged I srael's right to exist and will not forgo violence as a means of ending the occupation of Palestinian territory. For more than three decades, a major focus of my personal interests and political activities has been to help end the conflict among Israelis and their neighbors. As president of the United States and a leader of The Carter Center, I have had a special opportunity to study the complex and interrelated issues and to consult with leaders of all significant factions in the region who have been involved in these issues and will have to play key roles in reaching this elusive goal. I have learned some useful lessons, which I hope will help the reader understand the current situation more clearly. Despite the recent lack of progress, I see this as a unique time for hope, not despair. The outlines of a peace agreement are clear and have broad international support. There is a remarkable compatibility among pertinent United Nations resolutions, previous peace agreements reached at Camp David and in Oslo, the publicly declared policy of the United States, the Geneva Accord, key goals of the International Quartet's Roadmap for Peace, and tentative proposals made by all Arab nations for reconciliation with Israel. Perhaps most important, there is an overwhelming common desire for peaceful and prosperous lives among the citizens of Israel, Palestine, Lebanon, Syria, Jordan, and Egypt. Tentative steps are being taken or contemplated by these players, all waiting to be consummated with American leadership. We already have a firm promise from our new president that he will make a personal effort for Middle East peace from the beginning of his administration. The United States will find all parties to the conflict -- and leaders of other nations -- eager to support strong, fair, and persistent leadership from Washington. This will not be easy. Everyone who engages in Middle East peacemaking is bound to make mistakes and suffer frustrations. Everyone must overcome the presence of hatred and fanaticism, and the memories of horrible tragedies. Everyone must face painful choices and failures in negotiations. Nevertheless, I am convinced that the time is ripe for peace in the region. In the following pages I will describe -- as succinctly and clearly as possible -- the past history, my own personal involvement and observations, present circumstances, key players, and steps that can and must be taken by the president of the United States to realize this dream of peace, with justice, in the Holy Land. Experiences of the recent past offer valuable lessons as to what to avoid and how to proceed. In fact, I learned a lot from the reaction to the publication of my book Palestine Peace Not Apartheid . When I completed the text of this book about Palestine in the summer of 2006, there had not been a day of peace talks for more than five years. In addition, there was no discussion in our country of the basic issues involved, and little interest in the subject. I and others representing The Carter Center had monitored three elections in the occupied territories and had gained an intimate knowledge of the people in the West Bank and Gaza and the issues that shaped their lives. I wanted a good forum to present my views, and I felt that explaining my book throughout the country would best meet this need. I knew from experience how very difficult it was to sustain any objective political analysis in the United States of this important subject, primarily because few prominent political candidates or officeholders would voice any criticism of the current policies of the Israeli government. This meant that news media that were inclined to be objective had little to report other than occasional stories originated by their correspondents in the Middle East. On my visits to the region I found these reporters very knowledgeable, and they shared many of my concerns. I felt a personal responsibility to describe the situation, as best I could, to the American public, the news media, and members of Congress. I wanted to stimulate debate and perhaps some interest in reviving the moribund peace process. These were the underlying purposes of my book. For most American readers, my book was the first time they had encountered both sides of these complex issues, including some rare criticism of Israeli policies in the occupied territories. Only by explaining both perspectives would it be possible to see how differences could be resolved and peace achieved. As the text neared completion, I wanted a title that would be both descriptive and provocative. The working name on my computer was simply "Palestine Peace," but I didn't consider this to be adequate. I also tried "Land, Walls, Guns, or Peace," and finally decided on "Palestine Peace Not -- -- ," and began to search for the most descriptive final word. Over a period of weeks it became clear that it was apartheid , a word that had been used many times by prominent Israelis, Israeli news media, and visiting observers. These included a former attorney general, scholars and legislators, editors of major newspapers, human rights organizations, and litigants who appealed to the Israeli Supreme Court. Many of them used and explained the word in harsher terms than I, pointing out that this occupation and oppression are contrary to the tenets of the Jewish faith and the basic principles of the nation of Israel. Nelson Mandela, Archbishop Desmond Tutu, and human rights activists from South Africa who visited the territories had used the same description. I intended the word apartheid to describe a situation where two peoples dwelling on the same land are forcibly segregated from each other, and one group dominates the other. I thought the title and text would make it clear that the book was about conditions and events in the Palestinian territories and not in Israel and that the forced separation and domination of Arabs by Israelis were based on the acquisition of land and not on race, as had been the case in South Africa. I realized that this might cause some concern in Israel and among I srael's supporters in America, but I intended to emphasize these distinctions in dozens of public presentations. Before this happened, I had copies delivered directly to the offices of all members of the U.S. Senate and House of Representatives. This proved to be a mistake. Without claiming to have read the text, some prominent Democrats condemned the title, and this provided the basis for many of the questions during my subsequent media discussions. In more than a hundred interviews and many speeches, I found the questioning to be challenging and not unpleasant, but I was surprised and distressed when I was accused of being an anti-Semite, senile, a liar, a plagiarist, a racist, unfamiliar with the region, and a supporter of terrorism -- these charges were made in public statements and in full-page newspaper advertisements. This was especially painful because some of the ad hominem attacks came from Jewish friends and organizations that had been supporters and allies while I was president and during the succeeding years. In retrospect, I should have realized that the previous use of the word apartheid during the spirited debates in Israel had already aroused the sensitivity of many Israeli supporters in America about I srael's being equated with the racist regime in South Africa. To introduce it into an almost nonexistent discussion of the Palestinian issue in our country was highly controversial. Another factor was a carryover from my presidential years, of doubts about my commitment to Israel, as will be described in Chapters 2 and 3. Also, I underestimated the debating skills of those with whom I was now engaged, and was surprised by their personal attacks. Another mistake was not attempting to build earlier and broader political support among groups that were dedicated to peace in the Middle East. I was eager to explain my thesis to every available audience, but I especially enjoyed the exchanges at a number of universities where I spoke and then answered questions from large groups of students. In each case I urged them and their professors to visit Palestine and ascertain whether I had exaggerated or mistakenly described the situation. Christian travel groups and other tourists were encouraged to visit Bethlehem and other holy sites within Palestine to observe the intrusive wall and the devastating impact of the occupation on the lives of Palestinian Christians. Although I did not enjoy some of the criticisms, the book and my explanations of it did bring about a debate, which was my principal goal. In addition, President Bush finally announced a peace initiative, to begin with a conference in Annapolis, Maryland, with observers invited from a wide range of countries. In August 2006, Jeff Skoll, chairman of Participant Productions, asked if I would permit a full-length documentary film to be made about my work at The Carter Center. He was the first president of eBay and more recently had produced the Al Gore film, An Inconvenient Truth, and several other motion pictures that accumulated eleven Oscar nominations that year. Later, I agreed to the proposal when he informed me that Jonathan Demme ( The Silence of the Lambs , Philadelphia ) had offered to direct the film. Jonathan and I considered several theme options, including our Carter Center work in Africa and our Habitat for Humanity projects building homes in the area of the Gulf Coast damaged by Hurricane Katrina. He finally decided just to follow me around with high-definition cameras and record my daily activities. In November, his filming included the early days of travels to explain the Palestine book. There were dramatic news media interviews, discussions, arguments, speeches, book signings, and demonstrations that produced more than a hundred hours of recorded activities. These were interspersed with more tranquil scenes as I lectured at Emory University, interrelated with my neighbors and family, taught Bible lessons, made furniture, painted, exercised, and performed the duties of a farmer. Titled Jimmy Carter Man from Plains , the motion picture premiered in July 2007 and won several awards at film festivals. The high point of the film was my lecture and exchanges with the students at Brandeis University, which were charged with emotion and encapsulated the complex factors that must be addressed in the search for peace. Copyright (c) 2009 by Jimmy Carter Excerpted from We Can Have Peace in the Holy Land: A Plan That Will Work by Jimmy Carter All rights reserved by the original copyright owners. Excerpts are provided for display purposes only and may not be reproduced, reprinted or distributed without the written permission of the publisher.
