Tense bees and shell-shocked crabs : are animals conscious?

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Title:

Tense bees and shell-shocked crabs : are animals conscious?

Author:

Tye, Michael, author.

ISBN:

9780190278014

Physical Description:

xvii, 231 pages : illustrations ; 22 cm

Contents:

Experience and its limits : the problem -- Experience and consciousness. Problem cases? ; The higher-order theory of consciousness ; Phenomenal consciousness versus access consciousness ; Self-consciousness ; The upshot for animal consciousness -- It's got to be human! Descartes and the animals ; Descartes and Turing ; Conceptualism about experience -- Our friends and neighbors. Beliefs and desires ; Experiences and feelings -- Reasoning about other species. Cupcake's pain ; Sharpening the issue ; Is the absence of a neocortex a defeater? ; Should we be agnostic? ; Alternative strategies -- A fish called Wanda. Pain ; Fish nociception and fish behavior ; Is there a better explanation? ; Fish fear ; Perceptual consciousness in fish ; Yes, but are there really fish qualia? -- Of birds and reptiles (and fish). The origins of birds ; Bird emotions ; Birds and pain ; Perceptual experiences in birds ; Reptiles -- Tense bees and shell-shocked crabs. Insect nociception and pain ; Insects and emotions ; Are bees zombies? ; Crabs and pain ; Crabs and bees -- The girl who can't feel pain. A complaint from Block ; Protozoa ; Plants ; Caterpillars -- Commander Data and Robot Rabbit. The original China-body problem ; Reasoning about commander data ; The silicon chip argument ; Real rabbit and robot rabbit ; A further reason for preferring the view that commander data and robot rabbit are conscious ; A final consideration -- The ethical treatment of animals. Animal welfarism ; Speciesism ; Regan and Rawls ; Centered speciesism and biological proximity ; The treatment of animals.

Subject Term:

Consciousness in animals.

Summary:

What is it like 'on the inside' for nonhuman animals? Do they feel anything? Most people happily accept that dogs, for example, share many experiences and feelings with us. But what about simpler creatures? Fish? Honeybees? Crabs? Turning to the artificial realm, what about robots? This work presents answers to these questions.

Holds:

Available:*

Library	Call Number	Status
Searching... R.H. Stafford Library (Woodbury)	591.5 TYE	Searching... Unknown

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Summary

Summary

A consideration of some of the most common questions about animal minds.Do birds have feelings? Can fish feel pain? Could a honeybee be anxious? For centuries, the question of whether or not animals are conscious like humans has prompted debates among philosophers and scientists. While most people gladly accept that complex mammals - such as dogs - share emotions and experiences with us, the matter of simpler creatures is much less clear. Meanwhile, the advent of the digital age and artificial intelligence has created an added dimension to questions about non-human consciousness. In Tense Bees and Shell-Shocked Crabs, Michael Tye offers answers to some of today's most pressing questions about nonhuman consciousness. Blending the latest research about animal sensation with theories about the nature of consciousness, Tye develops a methodology for addressing the mysteries of the animal mind. Without endorsing any specific theory on the nature of consciousness, Tye tackles issues such as the animal experience of pain and fear, and the role of brain anatomy in determining consciousness. He then turns his attention to the artificial realm, considering whether complex robots could ever be considered conscious. Tye concludes with a discussion of how, if we consider animals conscious, this might impact our ethical obligations to them. From insects to crabs, fish to birds, Tense Bees and Shell-Shocked Crabs offers an insightful exploration of the ways in which animals relate to the world. Tense Bees and Shell-Shocked Crabs will appeal to students and scholars of philosophy and neuroscience, as well as general readers with an interest in animal and environmental ethics.

Author Notes

Michael Tye encountered philosophy at Oxford and taught at Temple University, St. Andrews, and the University of London before coming to the University of Texas at Austin in 2003, where he is the Dallas TACA Centennial Professor in Liberal Arts.

Reviews (2)

Publisher's Weekly Review

Tye, a philosopher at the University of Texas-Austin, adopts a dual philosophical and biological approach in asking whether nonhuman animals are conscious beings. Philosophically, Tye attempts to define what it means to be conscious and to have experiences, as opposed to simply reacting mechanistically to environmental stimuli. Biologically, he summarizes numerous behavioral studies of animals, including fish, birds, and reptiles. Tye persuasively presents his fascinating scientific evidence; animals appear to be capable of far more complex behavioral responses and learning than many researchers previously imagined. His discussion of the philosophical underpinnings, however, is complicated and likely frustrating to the nonspecialist, with its heavy emphasis on semantics. In an ironic twist, Tye is extremely careful about his use of philosophical language yet is far more lax when it comes to biology. He repeatedly refers to "Mother Nature" and attributes intentional creative powers to it, failing to recognize that this is not how natural selection functions. Also, his final chapter, addressing the ethical treatment of animals, is too brief and superficial to add anything meaningful to that discussion. Tye does present a convincing conclusion, identifying as a form of speciesism the assumption that animals physiologically distinct from humans are not conscious and therefore unable to have meaningful experiences. (Dec.) © Copyright PWxyz, LLC. All rights reserved.

Choice Review

Various scientific disciplines have produced a considerable body of research indicating that animals across many taxonomic categories have impressive cognitive abilities. Agreement for animal cognition is widespread. Whether or not animals have emotions, consciousness, or experiences yields more argumentative discussions. Tye (Univ. of Texas at Austin), in considering philosophical positions and backed by scientific findings, derives a highly structured set of arguments in support of animal consciousness. While laying out problems of subjective versus objective elements of animal experience, he presents theories of consciousness and, ultimately, a case for animal consciousness through the elimination of numerous arguments--many of which are based on human requisite criteria. Tye admits that there is no way to prove "correctness" but that there are theories that are more "rational." As such, some readers will likely be unconvinced. There is a divide between those who think that animals have emotions, feel pain, and have awareness and those who assert such views lack evidence and entail anthropomorphism. Regardless of perspective, this book should make readers reexamine their views on what it means to be a conscious being and have experiences. Summing Up: Highly recommended. Upper-division undergraduates and above; faculty and professionals. --Zane Brian Johnson, Lake Erie College

Table of Contents

Acknowledgments	p. xi
Introduction	p. xiii
1 Experience and Its Limits: The Problem	p. 1
2 Experience and Consciousness	p. 12
2.1 Problem Cases?	p. 13
2.2 The Higher-Order Theory of Consciousness	p. 17
2.3 Phenomenal Consciousness versus Access Consciousness	p. 21
2.4 Self-Consciousness	p. 27
2.5 The Upshot for Animal Consciousness	p. 29
3 It's Got to Be Human!	p. 30
3.1 Descartes and the Animals	p. 31
3.2 Descartes and Turing	p. 37
3.3 Conceptualism about Experience	p. 42
4 Our Friends and Neighbors	p. 49
4.1 Beliefs and Desires	p. 49
4.2 Experiences and Feelings	p. 57
5 Reasoning about Other Species	p. 69
5.1 Cupcake's Pain	p. 69
5.2 Sharpening the Issue	p. 71
5.3 Is the Absence of a Neocortex a Defeater?	p. 78
5.4 Should We Be Agnostic?	p. 84
5.5 Alternative Strategies	p. 86
6 A Fish Called Wanda	p. 91
6.1 Pain	p. 93
6.2 Fish Nociception and Fish Behavior	p. 96
6.3 Is There a Better Explanation?	p. 102
6.4 Fish Fear	p. 107
6.5 Perceptual Consciousness in Fish	p. 111
6.6 Yes, but Are There Really Fish Qualia?	p. 118
7 Of Birds and Reptiles (and Fish)	p. 121
7.1 The Origins of Birds	p. 122
7.2 Bird Emotions	p. 125
7.3 Birds and Pain	p. 127
7.4 Perceptual Experiences in Birds	p. 129
7.5 Reptiles	p. 131
8 Tense Bees and Shell-Shocked Crabs	p. 134
8.1 Insect Nociception and Pain	p. 134
8.2 Insects and Emotions	p. 141
8.3 Are Bees Zombies?	p. 148
8.4 Crabs and Pain	p. 156
8.5 Crabs and Bees	p. 158
9 The Girl Who Can't Feel Pain	p. 160
9.1 A Complaint from Block	p. 163
9.2 Protozoa	p. 166
9.3 Plants	p. 168
9.4 Caterpillars	p. 172
10 Commander Data and Robot Rabbit	p. 175
10.1 The Original China-Body Problem	p. 176
10.2 Reasoning about Commander Data	p. 179
10.3 The Silicon Chip Argument	p. 182
10.4 Real Rabbit and Robot Rabbit	p. 189
10.5 A Further Reason for Preferring the View that Commander Data and Robot Rabbit Are Conscious	p. 194
10.6 A Final Consideration	p. 196
11 The Ethical Treatment of Animals	p. 199
11.1 Animal Welfarism	p. 200
11.2 Speciesism	p. 203
11.3 Regan and Rawls	p. 205
11.4 Centered Speciesism and Biological Proximity	p. 206
11.5 The Treatment of Animals	p. 209
References	p. 215
Index	p. 227

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