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Summary
Summary
Popular history marks October 28, 1962, as the end of the Cuban Missile Crisis. Yet as JFK's secretly recorded White House tapes reveal, the aftermath of the crisis was a political and diplomatic minefield. The president had to push hard to get Khrushchev to remove Soviet weaponry from Cuba without reigniting the volatile situation, while also tackling midterm elections and press controversy. With a new preface that highlights recently declassified information, historian David G. Coleman puts readers in the Oval Office during the turning point of Kennedy's presidency and the watershed of the Cold War.
Author Notes
The director of the Miller Center's Presidential Recordings Program, David G. Coleman is a history professor at the University of Virginia. He lives in Arlington.
Reviews (4)
Publisher's Weekly Review
Coleman uses a neglected source as the basis for an unusual perspective on the 1962 Cuban missile crisis, the narrative beginning after Nikita Khrushchev agreed to remove nuclear missiles from Cuba. Director of the Miller Center's Presidential Recordings Program, Coleman uses secret White House tapes, authorized by President Kennedy, to show that the crisis didn't end there. A closely kept secret, the tapes offer "unguarded, unrehearsed" testimony to the complex problems that remained as the missiles of October ostensibly stood down. Plugging leaks had high priority in the crisis's aftermath. in good part to shore up the administration's image of effectiveness. Kennedy's tacit acceptance of a nonnuclear Soviet military presence reflected his conviction that Khrushchev's miscalculations in Cuba could in turn lessen the tension over another cold war flashpoint, West Berlin-if America's administration spoke little, acted moderately, and showed a united front. That required a level of news management that by February 1963 led to political and media criticism sufficiently intense to inspire transparency. The decision to publicize intelligence information on the Cuban situation defused the immediate issue. It also, Coleman asserts, might have confirmed the missile crisis as "a promising pivot point" had Kennedy's presidency not been truncated in Dallas. 20 photos. (Oct.) (c) Copyright PWxyz, LLC. All rights reserved.
Booklist Review
There have been numerous and exhaustive studies of the Cuban missile crisis of 1962. They generally concentrate on the 13 days of October that ended with Khrushchev's decision to withdraw the missiles. Coleman, history professor at the University of Virginia, carries the story several steps further in an engrossing and revealing account. Utilizing recently released White House tapes, he shows that a crisis atmosphere still prevailed within the administration after the apparent acquiescence of the Soviets. Kennedy and his advisors struggled with issues of Soviet compliance with the agreement, the difficulty in coping with a still-belligerent and supposedly dangerous Cuba, and especially with the potential flashpoint of Berlin. Kennedy expressed hopes that the pullback from the brink of war would moderate Soviet behavior in Berlin, provided the U.S. showed similar restraint. Yet, with an election looming, advisors also feared being labeled soft on communism, so strong efforts were made to manage news regarding U.S. approaches to the Soviets. Coleman has provided an excellent analysis of both short- and long-term results of the crisis.--Freeman, Jay Copyright 2010 Booklist
Kirkus Review
A historian looks at the crisis-related problems remaining on President John F. Kennedy's desk in the immediate wake of the Cold War's most dangerous moment. Coleman (History/Univ. of Virginia; co-author, Real-World Nuclear Deterrence: The Making of International Strategy, 2006) reminds us that for Kennedy and his advisors, the crisis played out for months afterward, really until February 1963. Drawing heavily from the secret White House tapes, the author reconstructs the debates within the administration on at least three issues of greatest concern. First, notwithstanding Krushchev's agreement to withdraw "the weapons you call offensive" from Cuba, serious questions remained as to what exactly he meant. Long-range nuclear weapons, of course, but did the Soviet premier intend to include bombers, Russian combat troops and short-range missiles? Moreover, with Cuba vetoing any ground inspections, how would the United States verify that the missiles were gone? Second, satisfying the American public on this score was part of what drove JFK's determination to channel and control the story, and to counter the inevitable Republican charges of mismanagement of and responsibility for the possible intelligence failure the nuclear showdown exposed. Third, this effort exacerbated an ongoing battle with the press about the administration's tight hold over information, needless restrictions, critics charged, that enabled the government to "manage the news" for its own political ends. Coleman treats Kennedy well, calling his authorization of warrantless wiretaps on journalists merely "dubious," skipping lightly over the administration's willingness to appease public concern by exposing intelligence collection capabilities, and generally approving of the president's unwillingness to press Krushchev too far on Russian concessions. A briskly charted tale of the neglected denouement of the defining event of JFK's presidency.]] Copyright Kirkus Reviews, used with permission.
Library Journal Review
The 13 days of the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis, which brought the world close to nuclear crisis, were the most harrowing of the Cold War. Coleman (history & director, Presidential Recordings Program, Miller Ctr., Univ. of Virginia) reveals that the possibility of a U.S.-USSR war did not end on October 28, 1962, when Khrushchev promised to remove all offensive nuclear missiles from Cuba and Kennedy lifted the naval blockade. The author draws on Kennedy's 260 hours of secret White House tapes and presidential and foreign relations records to offer a narrative covering from October 29, 1962, through February 1963, when tensions subsided and relations between the two superpowers began to improve. Among the most difficult negotiating points were supervising the removal of the missiles, determining which missiles were offensive or defensive, and whether all Soviet troops would be required to leave. Interestingly, Khrushchev removed all tactical nuclear weapons because he worried about Castro's stability following the Cuban leader's order to shoot down all American surveillance planes. -VERDICT Although at times the text bogs down in detail, this informative account of the immediate domestic and international complications of the crisis will attract general readers with an interest in the era. [See Prepub Alert, 4/16/12.]-Karl -Helicher, Upper Merion Township Lib., King of Prussia, PA (c) Copyright 2012. Library Journals LLC, a wholly owned subsidiary of Media Source, Inc. No redistribution permitted.
Table of Contents
| Preface | p. 7 |
| 1 The Ultimate Source of Action | p. 19 |
| 2 The Fourteenth Day | p. 33 |
| 3 Eyes in the Sky | p. 47 |
| 4 The Postmortem Season | p. 55 |
| 5 Mockingbird Don't Sing | p. 64 |
| 6 The Bomber Problem | p. 78 |
| 7 Standing in Judgment | p. 91 |
| 8 A Tub of Butter | p. 108 |
| 9 The Military Problem | p. 118 |
| 10 Missiles of November | p. 135 |
| 11 A Deal | p. 146 |
| 12 With One Voice | p. 150 |
| 13 The Missiles We've Had on Our Minds | p. 164 |
| 14 Removing the Straitjacket | p. 170 |
| 15 A Political Firefight | p. 192 |
| 16 Shaping the Future | p. 208 |
| Acknowledgments | p. 213 |
| Notes | p. 215 |
| Index | p. 249 |
